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I.
It is a commonplace of Ockham commentary that he changed his position
on what concepts are. While I see no reason to question the general lines
of the familiar story, I do think there are some interesting details along the
way which are not always emphasized and which raise (for me at least) the
question of whether we understand just what was going on.1
The development of Ockham’s thought on the topic divides, I think,
into two unequal stages, the first of which can again be divided into three.2
(1) He began by favoring a sort of double aspect scheme. The act of think-
ing itself is a real, individual quality existing “subjectively” in the mind. But
as representative, we might say, it requires an object. In his early account,
Ockham posits the concept as the object of our thinking, holding that of it-
self it must, like a fictional entity or fictum, have merely “objective” existence
and not real or “subjective” existence.3 Call this the fictum theory. (2) After
1. One cannot do better than Marilyn Adams’s extensive and critical account.
See the index (under “Concepts”) in her William Ockham 2 vols. (Notre Dame: Uni-
versity of Notre Dame Press, 1987).
2. The relevant texts are listed below. Using standard abbreviations, I cite vol-
ume and page (sometimes followed by “/line(s)”) of the critical edition, Gideon
Gal et al., eds., Opera philosophica et theologica, 17 vols. (St. Bonaventure, NY: The
Franciscan Institute, 1967–1988). It is estimated now that all these texts were written
between (about) 1317 and 1324, when Ockham was called to Avignon to answer
charges of heresy; however, it is difficult to be precise in dating their individual
composition. For purposes of the development of Ockham’s views on the concept,
however, the following rough groupings seem clear enough. The earliest (1317–
19) is the Reportata of his commentary on the Sentences: In I Sententiarum, d 2,
q 8 (OTh II, 266–89). A middle group (1320–22?) consists of his addition to that
text (OTh II, 289–92), and the Expositio in librum perihermenias Aristotelis, prologue
(OPh II, 345–376). The next (1323–24?) is Summa Logicae, chaps. 12, 14, 15, and
40 (OPh I, 41–44, 47–54, 111–13). His final position is set out in Quodlibeta septem
III, 8 and IV 35 (OTh IX, 232–37, 469–74), and esp. Quaestiones in libros physicorum
Aristotelis (OPh VI, 396–410).
3. Adams, William Ockham, pp. 74–75. ‘Object’ is a word that can do many jobs,
perhaps especially among medieval writers. It should be kept distinct from ‘content’
and even ‘significatum’ I shall use it as equivalent to “something cognized,” where
“something” can be broadly construed.
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a short time—the whole story takes place in about eight years—Ockham
decided that it would be equally as probable to hold a theory that simply
identifies the concept with the act of thinking.4 Call this the mental-act the-
ory. And (3) Ockham soon enough comes to favor it over the fictum theory.
Throughout this first stage in the development of his thought, how-
ever, while Ockham’s preferences change, he treats the alternate positions
as plausible or “difficult to disprove.”5 And that should give us pause; in
fact, I take it as a test for any hypothesis about what is going on in this (tri-
partite) stage. What can Ockham be thinking of that makes him so tolerant
of the alternatives? The changes cannot be anything like that from real-
ist to nominalist, intentionalist to extensionalist or realist to antirealist; for
no proponent of any of those alternatives would stand for a take-your-pick
approach.
Ockham’s ultimate position, in what I am calling the second stage in his
development, is different in this respect; for there he rejects all alternatives
but the mental-act theory. Most significantly, he offers an antirepresenta-
tionist argument as a refutation of the fictum theory.6 As we shall see, this
final change carries its own interpretive problems. Marilyn Adams notes a
significant shift of attention from what universal concepts are to what and
how they signify; and as we shall see, there is something to the idea that
Ockham is changing the topic as much as changing his mind.7
In the immediately following sections, I provide more detail on
Ockham’s developing position. In Section 4, I discuss the “Terminator Prin-
ciple,” which, I think, carries the weight in both his early and later positions.
In Section 5, I develop an analogy from art to bring out what I think is
peculiar to Ockham’s account of ficta. Section 6 offers a guess at what is
going on in the first stage of his thought. Section 7 sets out my guess about
what is going on in the second or ultimate stage in Ockham’s account of the
concept. Finally Section 8 provides a summary and conclusions.
II.
It is helpful to review what does and does not change in the sequence of
texts. As it happens, each time Ockham takes up the topic, the explicit
question he asks shifts slightly. Ockham treats “passio animae,” “intentio
animae,” and “conceptus” as synonyms; however, he tends to favor one or
4. See n. 2, above.
5. Ord. I, d 2, q 8 (OPh II, 270).
6. Sense-datum theory would be an instance of representationism, where “I see
a table” would be analyzed along these lines: “I have such-and-such a sensation and
(for such-and-such reasons) I conclude that I am seeing a table.”
7. Adams, William Ockham, p. 107. There is something to anything Professor
Adams has to say about Ockham.
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another of them depending on the context.8 The earlier passages appear
under the question of the status of universals.9 There is nothing in them
that would make us change our minds about Ockham’s nominalism (or
conceptualism). But the setting is special. For Ockham considers “univer-
sals” there as one among many things that do not or cannot exist.10 The prob-
lem, therefore, is not unlike that of accounting for our talk (or thought)
about fictional things, for example, talk about Hamlet or the chimera. I
shall have more to say about this, but the upshot is that Ockham claims, in
the early texts, that a universal (e.g., asinus/donkey11), as the object of our
thought, is something that has only objective existence in the mind.12
Ockham’s discussion of concepts in his commentary on the Periherme-
nias is set in the context of Aristotle’s claim that written and spoken terms
are signs (notae) of “passiones animae”; and the question Ockham explicitly
asks there is: “What are these passiones?”13 The problem here is importantly
different from the earlier question, for it has to do with the character or
status of any concept, factual or fictional. Still, if the issue is how we should
talk about the concept (or passio animae), it would not be surprising if the
earlier analysis of the fictional and/or non-existent had some carryover into
this treatment of concepts generally.14
The Summa Logicae is an explicit presentation of Ockham’s logical
(and/or semantic) schema. And he introduces concepts—“conceptus” is
the favored word here—under the rubric of mental terms.15 He still allows
the possibility of an objective-existence theory, but he clearly favors the
8. “Synonym” may be too strong. Ockham just says that different terms have
been used by various authors: Expos. perih., prologue 3 (OPh II, 349/5–8).
9. In sent. I, d 2, q 8 (OTh II, 266).
10. These include impossible things (chimera, goat-stags), fictional characters
(Hamlet), things that are not contradictory but that cannot exist (the second inten-
tional objects of logic, including propositions, syllogisms and universals), and things
that could but do not exist (possible individuals before God creates them or that
are never created). In sent. I, d 2, q 8 (OTh II, 273–74). Hamlet is not an impossible
thing (like the goat-stag), but he cannot exist because he is by definition fictional.
11. Ockham is not concerned here about the predicate in “Brunellus is a donkey”
so much as the subject in “The donkey is a mammal.” Ockham agrees with Aristotle
that science is about what is universal and necessary; and he has the courage of his
convictions in holding that science is therefore about concepts (which signify real
things): Expos. physicorum, prologue, 4 (OPh IV, 11–12).
12. A distinction between subjective and objective existence is traditional, tho-
ugh it may mark importantly different issues: see section 5, and esp. nn. 51 and 52.
13. Epos. perih., prologue 2–3 (OPh II, 348).
14. At this point, Ockham is thinking of the concept as an object of an act of
thinking, not the act itself which has subjective existence throughout. See also n. 26.
15. For the relevant discussion of terms, see Summa Logicae, I, cc. 1–3 (OPh I,
7–14). Although the semantic project is explicit here, Ockham is working throughout
with the notion of a mental language where concepts are mental terms: see the first
regulative principle for concepts in section 3, and the end of section 6, below.
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mental-act theory, noting the advantage of its theoretical simplicity.16 In
fact, Ockham has probably abandoned the fictum theory by this time; but I
think it important to keep that decision separate from what lies behind the
texts of what I am calling the second stage, that is, the Quodlibeta and the
Questions on the Physics. The context there is how to handle second intentions,
which are the subject matter of logic. And Ockham says (in effect) that he
does not need the fictum theory to explain that.17 More significantly, he also
introduces a new criticism of ficta for “getting in the way” of our knowledge
of the world.18 I shall have more to say about that as well, but for the moment,
let me turn to what does not change throughout Ockham’s discussions.
Despite his changing allegiance, Ockham is consistent throughout in
listing five candidate theories on the nature of the concept.19
1. One theory holds that the concept is a substance or quality exter-
nal to the mind. This covers realist views on universals, not only the
free-floating Ideas of the Platonists, but the “moderate” position on
common natures in Scotus and others.20 Ockham simply dismisses
the proposal in these texts; though we know he has extensive criti-
cisms of the realist positions elsewhere.
2. A second theory holds that the concept is a “species.” Again, we
know that Ockham has treated the issue of (sensible and intelligible)
“species” elsewhere. Here, he simply rejects them as in violation of a
criterion, discussed below: viz., a concept cannot exist except when
the act of thinking does; species can so exist; ergo, etc.21
3. A third theory holds that the concept is identical with the act of
thinking (a real quality existing subjectively in the mind). This is
the mental-act theory.
4. A fourth proposal is that the concept is a real quality distinct from
the act of thinking but existing subjectively in the mind. Commenta-
tors tend to ignore this candidate, and Ockham gives little attention
to it. But he does offer (in one place) a consideration in its favor. As
something real, such a mental quality would function rather like a
statue in representing its subject; and that, he thinks, would support
16. Summa Logicae, c. 12 (OPh I, 42–43/33–39).
17. I discuss this in section 7.
18. Quaest. physicorum, q. 1 (OPh VI, 397) ; Quodlibeta IV, q. 35 (OTh IX, 472–74).
I follow the rhetoric of Ockham’s antirepresentationist argument. The representa-
tionist, of course, would hardly agree that sense data, say, “get in the way,” holding
rather that they are the only means we have for getting knowledge of the world.
19. Expos. perih., prologue 4–10 (OPh II, 349–71). In sent. I, d 2, q 8, passim
(OTh II 266–92). Quaest. physicorum, QQ. 1–6 (OPh VI, 397–410). The candidates
do not always appear in the same order.
20. He manages to get Roscellin in under this rubric of the concept as external:
In sent. I, d 2, q 8, (OTh II 271; and see n. 1 there.)
21. Expos. perih., prologue 5 (Oph II, 351/11–12).
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a more direct sense of “likeness” than would something having only
objective existence (as in the fifth candidate).22
5. A fifth candidate is the fictum theory, holding that the concept is
a quality distinct from the act of thinking but having only objective
existence in the mind.
Ockham’s discussions of the pros and cons of the five candidate po-
sitions appeal to pretty much the same data throughout. This is especially
true in the first stage while he holds that the last three positions are all at
least probable.23 Naturally enough, Ockham spends more time defending
the fictum theory in his early writings and more time in his later writings
defending the mental-act theory. In the end, he does argue that only the
mental act theory will do. But that turns on the new argument that holds the
concept-as-object would “get in the way” of our thinking about the world.24
III.
Another constant, running through Ockham’s treatment in both stages, is
a set of three principles that any theory about the concept must respect.25
1. Concepts must be able to supposit for and signify things naturally
just as written and spoken terms do by convention.
2. If not identical with the act of thinking, concepts must exist only
with it.26
22. Expos. perih., prologue 7 (Oph II, 361/46–60). Ockham concerned here with
whether a theory makes the concept a real thing (a subjectively existing quality) or
not; he thus contrasts the statue as itself a separate thing with something in a painting
or a story. (And we do not speak of the figure “in” a statue.) Whether statues are
a different (or better) sort of likeness than paintings is an interesting but different
question.
23. In sent. I, d. 2, q. 8 (OTh II, 270/17–20. In other places, whether he is being
altogether up front about it or not, Ockham says he will leave it to the metaphysi-
cians, [Expos. perih., prologue 3 (OPh II, 349/8–11)], or the “studiosi,” [Expos. perith.,
prologue 10 (OPh II, 371/34ff.)], or simply to “others” [In sent. I, d 2, q 8 (OTh II,
291/16–17)] to determine which is true.
24. Quaest. physicorum, q. 1 (OPh VI, 397) ; Quodlibeta IV, q. 35 (OTh IX, 472–74.
25. E.g., Expos. perih., prologue 4 (OPh II, 349/6–9).
26. In all these texts, Ockham is thinking of the concept as the unique content,
so to speak, of an individual act of thought; and he says that this cannot be a habit:
Quaest. physicorum, q. 8 (OPh VI. 414); cf. Expos. perih., prologue 5 (OPh II, 350f). But
I think Ockham would describe in terms of habits those cases where we might say
that someone has or lacks the concept of such-and-such. He also has the resources
to handle cases where, simply as familiar with a certain language, one might use a
word correctly without having the relevant concept. I suspect, moreover, that in the
context at hand, Ockham is thinking of relatively simple concepts and not constructs
that make up for one’s lack of experience with the kind of thing referred to.
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3. There is no cognition without something cognized (cognitum).
These points are worth a closer look.
The claim that concepts are the terms of mental language and are
natural signs of things is so familiar to readers of Ockham that one may
miss an anomaly in its appearance in the early texts. If one focuses solely
on the role of (concepts as) mental terms, there may seem to be no change
throughout Ockham’s writings. However, the underlying structure of that
account actually changes significantly.27 In his ultimate position, Ockham
holds that the relation of signs to one another and to things in the world is
all that is needed to deal with the problems that led him to the fictum theory.
Yet if he already had the idea of such a basic sign relation at the beginning,
the interpretive puzzle is less how he finally came to take up the mental-act
theory and more what kept him from adopting it in the first place. As I shall
try to explain below, part of the answer to the latter question is to be found in
the peculiarity of his account of ficta; and part is that he needed to develop
a more sophisticated schema for signification in order to get beyond it.
The contrast of natural and conventional signs deserves a brief com-
ment. Along with other medieval thinkers, Ockham follows Boethius in
describing written and spoken language as subordinate to mental lan-
guage, where the former are established by convention while the latter is
“natural.”28 ‘Asinus’ and ‘donkey’ are conventions of Latin and English, but
they are subordinate to the same concept. As the ground, as it were, for
(the use of) conventional language, such natural signs have a prestigious
status. Yet, since we cannot express ourselves directly in mental, there are
complications about any appeal to it.29
The contribution of the naturalness of natural signs, for Ockham, can
be misunderstood. It is tempting to suppose that a natural sign is in some
way a better likeness or representation than a conventional sign. But the
common analogy for concepts as natural signs is smoke as a natural sign
of fire. Somehow, as “fire” comes to mind when I see smoke, so “donkey”
arises in the mind of anyone who sees (enough) donkeys.30 Yet smoke bears
no likeness to fire.31 I suppose one could say that this case of smoking
is like other cases where smoking is brought about by fire, but the likeness
27. I discuss this at the end of section 6.
28. See, for example, Summa Logicae I, c. 1.
29. Ockham seems to treat the natural signs of mental language as introspectible,
but the case is surely more complex.
30. Summa Logicae II, c. 14 (OPh I, 286–88).
31. Smoke does not represent fire; so one does not locate an objectively existing
fire in smoke! We discover that smoke is (natural) sign of fire when we know of the
causal relation. And this is the case with the spoken term as a natural sign of the
speaker: Summa Logicae I, c. 1 (OPh I, 9/3–4); it does not represent the speaker.
Of course, we cannot observe the causal connection between concept or mental
term and its object. Attributing naturalness to the concept-as-sign, like attributing a
likeness to it, is (so to speak) a theoretical matter.
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there is between smoke and smoke. To bring fire into the picture, one needs
something other than likeness. As I understand Ockham’s ultimate position,
what is central to natural signification of concepts (as mental terms) is not
the representational (pictorial) connotation of “likeness” but rather the fact
that the concept arises automatically, as it were, in our experience.32 It is
an empirical fact, apparently due to the constitution of our minds, that the
mental term for ‘donkey’ arises in the mind of anyone who sees (enough)
donkeys and ‘cow’ arises upon seeing cows. And I think it is that fact alone
which Ockham thinks makes these concepts natural signs of things and not
their possessing some special internal quality, much less their revealing the
essence of things (or anything close to that).33
The second principle in the list set out above is used to eliminate both
realist (or externalist) accounts of the concept as well as intelligible species
(candidates 1 and 2, above). Ockham’s rejection of those positions is not
a surprise. But again, one wants to ask what then led him to his own early
idea that the act of thinking and the concept, though simultaneous, are
distinct? For it is the distinctness of the concept that he ultimately objects
to. This might lead one to suspect the ontological commitment of the appeal
to objective existence; however, I think Ockham’s ultimate criticism of the
fictum theory points rather to the concept-as-object as the culprit.34 The
change from the early theory, I suggest, is not just a simplification of his
ontology but involves an important shift in the structure of signification.35
IV.
The third of Ockham’s requirements deserves separate treatment. It ap-
pears in an early text in this form: “Something is ‘understood’ in any
‘understanding’.”36
32. Of course, Ockham frequently talks of the likeness of natural signs to their
objects. Professor Adams puts more emphasis on these “likeness” passages in part,
perhaps, because she sees Ockham’s appeal to natural signs within a project meant
to explain how concepts can represent the things they do. And she rightly argues that
natural signification is not adequate to that purpose (William Ockham, chap. 4, 3);
however, see her qualified conclusion on p. 132. I would like to avoid taking on
the question of what Ockham’s talk of likeness ultimately means for his cognitive
theory. But some things seem clear enough. Ockham surely did not think that we
gain knowledge of the world by looking at our concepts and judging from them some
like quality in things. Further, I do not think Ockham ever wavers in his opposition
to any hint of isomorphism as an account of cognition; see nn. 47 and 66.
33. See previous note.
34. He objects to the concept as object in the fictum theory for closing off the
cognitive process. See section 7.
35. See n. 76.
36. [O]mni intellectione aliquid intelligitur. (In sent., I, d. 2, q. 8 [OTh II, 268]).
I find the translation of “intellegere” (and its family) awkward. It is often translated
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And only a bit later and more fully as follows:
“Just as it is impossible for there to be vision and nothing seen, or for
there to be love and nothing loved, so it is impossible for there to be
cognition and nothing cognized by that cognition.”37
Frankly, I was at first tempted to suppose that this regulative principle was
meant primarily to support the introduction of Ockham’s awkward fictum
theory and (happily) vanished along with it.38 He argues there that, were
there no special object to serve as the terminus of our thought of non-
existents, we would be “thinking of nothing.”39 In his ultimate theory, how-
ever, Ockham dispenses with these special objects and, as one might expect,
with this “Terminator Principle” as well. It was something of a surprise, then,
to find the principle in Ockham’s latest treatment where the fictum theory is
anathema: “It is a contradiction to posit an ‘understanding’ in the intellect
unless something is ‘understood.’”40
If we assume, as I think we should, that, in his final theory, Ockham
subscribes to the same principle and not just the same formulation, it casts
a different light on what changes in his position and what does not. Briefly
put, it means that, although Ockham comes to reject the idea that an act
of thought must have a concept as its object (i.e., that the concept is the
“something cognized”), he holds throughout a strongly relational account
of cognition as oriented to some object. Something needs to be said, then,
as “to understand”; and the Latin can have that special connotation. However, I think
it often means simply “to think of.” The cognates are too ugly to hide behind.
37. [I]mpossibile est esse visionem et nihil videri, vel dilectionem et nihil diligi,
ita impossibile est esse cognitionem et nihil cognosci illa cognitione. Expos. perih.,
prologue 6 (OPh II, 352–53/37–39).
38. The analogy with vision has its problems. One might claim that Macbeth
only seemed to see a dagger before him. However, it won’t do to say that the Romans
only seemed to believe in Zeus, or that eighteenth-century physicists only seemed to
think that ether exists. As it happens, there are philosophers who take the contrast
to mark a difference between physical and mental action. If there is nothing that
undergoes being cut, no action of cutting has taken place. Yet the same does not
hold for thinking, believing, wanting, and the like. One can disagree with the claim
about a criterion for the mental without casting around for objects to undergo
being thought about, as I think Ockham does in his early theory. In his later theory,
I think Ockham can handle the problem as he does fictional entities, by regimenta-
tion.
39. Expos. perih., prologue, 6 (OPh II, 352–53). While we do not see this argument
as such later on, I think the idea is retained. Ockham decides he does not need
fictional objects or, most importantly, the concept-as-object. Had he abandoned the
requirement for an object of thought altogether, I think he would not have had to
eliminate terms for fictional objects or turned to goats and stags as the significata of
‘goat-stag.’
40. [C]ontradictio est quod ponantur intellectio in intellectu quin aliquid intelligatur.
(Quodlibet IV, q. 35, OTh IX, 473).
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about what Ockham means by “object” (or the something cognized). But I
do not think that calls for anything extravagant.
We can begin with the analogy to vision. The verbs Ockham appeals to
by way of analogy all are (or are equivalent to) transitive verbs. Of course,
Ockham knows that they do not represent transeunt actions: being seen
works no change in the thing seen.41 In fact, as an immanent action, see-
ing is something that takes place in the seer, but Ockham (rightly) treats
“seeing” as strongly relational. That is, if there is no correlate—something
seen—there is no action. If Sortes sees a tree, there need be no change
in the tree. But unless there really is a tree, Sortes is not really seeing at
all. Why should Ockham hold that thinking (cognoscere, intellegere) is like
that?
Suppose the problem Ockham is dealing with could be put in this way:
How should one characterize or identify a thought?42 That is, what makes
a thought the thought it is? Or what makes this thought different from
another? Among the many possible answers, two are of special interest for
my present purposes.43 On one, thoughts differ for having, so to speak, a
purely monadic character or quality quite independently of any external
things they might be used to signify. On the other, the identifying property
of a concept is relational: thoughts differ because of their different objects
or significata. This is the claim of the Terminator Principle.44
If we take the analogy with vision strictly, while the act of seeing is
“in” the agent or seer, the terminating object is an external thing of some
sort (e.g., the real tree that is seen) and not something internal such as
the (content of the) sensation itself.45 I do not think we have to interpret
the Terminator Principle as requiring for any act of thinking that I have a
particular individual (e.g., Brunellus) in mind. However, it does mean that
I can successfully think of “donkey” only if that actually signifies donkeys. As
I see it, this creates no more (and no less) of a metaphysical or ontological
problem than would any extensionalist theory of meaning (or one that
41. Ord. I, d. 36, q. 1 (OTh IV, 550/10–15); d. 43, q. 2 (646/12–14).
42. Ockham begins with the question “What is a concept?” Once the concept is
identified with the mental act, that amounts to “What is a thought?”
43. For example, when it occurs or in what mind it occurs. Consider the case
of written language, where one word can be distinguished from another by physical
location, but also by the letters that make them up. I assume Ockham finds no
analogy there with mental terms.
44. Ockham’s early account is, to say the least, ambiguous. His insistence that
there must be a terminating object even for thoughts of nonexistents is clearly
strongly relational; thus, when he abandons the fictum theory, it might seem that
he is shifting away from that position. Alternatively, Ockham’s early appeal to the
objective existence of any concept-object might suggest (as I shall explain below)
that he began with a monadic or internal account that is later abandoned. I will try
to sort this out.
45. I think it is correct to say one sees an after-image but not an hallucination.
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takes meaning in terms of reference rather than sense).46 As such, it would
seem to fit quite nicely with what I take is Ockham’s basic attitude towards
cognitive structure.47 And it is not the object of my criticism. What gets
Ockham in trouble (and what he ultimately rejects) is not a requirement
that thoughts bear an essential relation to objects but that the concept is
their proper object.48 And one of the things that contributed to his adopting
that unfortunate conclusion, I think, is his awkward treatment of ficta.
V.
Recall that Ockham first adopted the fictum theory in the context of our
talk of non-existent things. It might help if we step back from Ockham’s
account, for the moment, to consider that issue in a general way. There
are, as it happens, a number of ways to handle the problem. One is simply
to admit fictional things into one’s ontology. For example, Hamlet can be
taken as a possible individual and assigned whatever ontological status one
accords to possible individuals.49 Another possibility is to eliminate fictional
things by regimenting their occurrence in statement-making language. In
fact, the latter is Ockham’s ultimate preference.50
There is an alternative approach to the problem, however, that invokes
a notion of objective existence which I shall term esse objective simplex.51 As
46. The signification of (categorematic) terms, for Ockham is oriented toward
their use in propositions to supposit for things.
47. Ockham’s opposition to isomorphism is also relevant. As I understand his
nominalism, Ockham thinks our (categorematic) concepts are useful for sorting
things (donkeys from cows, say) but not as such revealing of the natures of things.
That may seem to some as (or as leading to) skepticism or even some form of
antirealism. But Ockham thinks the sorting is objective and applicable to real things.
He can deal with scientific inquiry in terms of causal relations and other properties
that he also holds are objective.
48. I think Ockham’s ultimate criticism of the fictum theory shows that the
concept-as-object, whatever its ontological status, was meant to bring the cognitive
process to a close. It is that which leads to its “getting in the way” of our knowledge
of things.
49. Ockham does come to admit some possible individuals, and I discuss this in
section 6. Adams explains (and criticizes) his commitment to unactualized possibles:
William Ockham, pp. 1060–61.
50. Summa Logicae, II, c. 14 (OPh I, 286–88).
51. I am not claiming an historical source for the schema for esse objective which
I describe in what follows. I call it “esse objective simplex” to contrast it with a
substantive metaphysical claim using similar terminology: for example, Aquinas’s
account of the form that is the intelligible species. There are many places where
Aquinas seems to treat the status of things “in the mind” as purely representational:
when I think of a stone, the stone is not in the mind but only its likeness. (De Veritate,
q. 23, a. 1; cf., q. 8, a. 9 ad 4) The production of the intelligible species by the intellect,
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Ockham notes, objective existence was familiar in the traditional under-
standing of the contrast between ens in anima and ens extra animam, where
things are “in” the mind in much the same way as they are “in” a story.52
This has the strange-sounding result that real mental qualities, such as joy
and sadness or the act of thinking itself, are extra animam ; however, that is
only a problem of terminology and should not be allowed to confuse a clear
enough idea. As it happens, however, Ockham’s appeal to the device of ob-
jective existence seems to me somewhat special. His reason for proposing
ficta in the early texts is that something must terminate the act of thinking
about universals (inter alia) in much the same way that real things terminate,
or serve as the objects of, our thinking about them.53 Objective existence
is brought in after the fact, so to speak, in order to mitigate the claim such
ficta might have on ontological status.
Perhaps I can bring out what I find awkward in Ockham’s account
by means of an analogy with art: specifically a contrast between portraits
and other representative painting.54 Portraiture is, in the sense I described
above, strongly relational. Take, for example, a portrait of the Queen Mum.
It is not necessary that it be a good likeness or that (like a photograph) it
have been done in the presence of the sitter. What makes this a portrait is
simply its relation to a real sitter.
For a painting to be representational, on the other hand, no “sitter”
is needed. Suppose I have made a drawing of flowers. Of course, I might
have been drawing some real flowers and intended it as a sort of “portrait”
with those flowers as “sitter.” Yet there need be no flowers that I intended
to portray. However, the drawing can still be representational and not, say,
abstract. Representative art is, I think, essentially “of something.” But “of
however, is significantly different. (It seems to be part of his account of what Aristotle
means by the mind’s “becoming the thing known”: q. 2, a. 2; q. 8, a. 8) According to
Aquinas, the form of heat, say, in a real object can (under the influence of the agent
intellect) produce a form in the intellect that makes the knower not hot but a knower
of heat. And he says that the form of heat, then, has an existence in the knower that
is different from its “natural existence” (in a hot thing). Such a form, therefore,
works a real change in the agent (from not-knowing to knowing): q. 3, a. 1; q. 10,
a. 4 and a. 6, ad 7; q. 24, a. 4. Whatever one thinks of the claim, it is a substantial
modification of the theory of form and not a description of representation: See
Geach in Anscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1961), pp. 94–96.
52. In sent. I, d. 2, q. 8 (OTh II. 273). When he switches to the mental act the-
ory, instead of dropping the traditional phrase, he offers the rather strained re-
interpretation of it as simply a contrast of what exists “subjectively” or really in a
mental or in a physical host: Expos. perih., prologue 6 (Oph II, 358/205–6); Expos.
perih., prologue 9 (368/135–39). See the similarly unconvincing gloss of “being of
reason” in Summa Logicae I, c. 40 (OPh I, 113/60ff.). Also see Quaest. Physicorum, q. 3
(OPh VI, 403/99–108).
53. E.g., Expos. perih., prologue 4 (OPh II, 349/3–9).
54. It may also help to bring out my contrast of relational and monadic properties
of thought.
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flowers,” in that context, is a monadic and not a relational property of the
painting (qua painting).55 Thus, the drawing can be “of-flowers” although
there are no flowers it is “about”; it characterizes the painting in terms of
an “internal” quality and not by its relation to a “sitter.”56 On this approach,
one need not cast around for a ghostly “sitter” in the real world—or for that
matter, in some possible or imaginary world—in order to make a painting
representational.
We can, of course, use the same language to talk about the flowers in the
painting that we do to talk of real flowers: there are six of them, say, or they
are in a vase, and so on. But that is a convention we (should) understand well
enough; when I point to the flowers, what I am pointing at is something like
marks on paper or an arrangement of shapes or color patches. For the most
part, people ordinarily handle such conventions for dealing with pictures
and stories with no confusion.57 It would do no credit to philosophy to lag
behind in this.
Objective existence in its simple form,58 then, is a descriptive device
for keeping these things straight; the idea is not to multiply things but to
mark different predications.59 Being-flowers, being-six-in-number, being-in-
a vase are real “beings” in our talk of real flowers; however, they are merely
objective “beings” in our talk of things in pictures. It is the same with talk
of characters in stories and plays. Shakespeare’s play, for example, is like
a representational painting and not a portrait. There can be no portrait
of Hamlet because there is no Hamlet for it to be a portrait of. We easily
slip into the idea that Hamlet has the independent status of someone who
has stories told about him. This, however, is an illusion—Hamlet has no
existence, subjective or objective, outside those representations of him.
Having settled Hamlet comfortably among the flowers, we can turn to
the related, and perhaps more controversial, appeal to objective existence in
connection with the content of any representation (fact or fiction). Consider
again, the portrait of the Queen Mum. Even in the portrait—more carefully
put: even when we talk about the portrait—it is possible to identify a figure
that is just as unreal as Hamlet or my flowers. Although I could point to the
55. I say “qua painting” to distinguish this property from various “physical” prop-
erties such as being marks on a page, composed (or bought and sold) by someone,
framed and so on.
56. The terms “of” and “about” do not make the point of themselves, and one’s
intuitions for them may change. I take “of-x” to be a quality (as it were) internal to
the representation; and I take “about x” to be strongly relational. See also n. 74.
57. “The Purple Rose of Cairo” is Woody Allen’s joke.
58. See n. 51.
59. As a matter of notation, one can simply introduce a new quantifier for ob-
jective “being.” In discussing illusions involving real things, as in Aureole’s cases
discussed in section 7, Adams, William Ockham, (p. 92) suggests relativizing such
predications. However, it is important in esse objective simplex (at least) that no real
thing has objectively existing properties. So I prefer separate quantifiers to empha-
size the category difference in “existence.”
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portrait and (correctly) say: “That is the Queen Mum,” and even though it is
a relation to the real Queen Mum that makes it a portrait, the Queen Mum is
herself neither really nor objectively in the portrait. To think that someone
could be in Buckingham Palace and a painting is a serious confusion, quite
beyond the grammatical infelicity about the poor woman who came home
in a sedan chair and a flood of tears.60
In sum, the appeal to objective existence, in the simple form I have
described, does no ontological heavy lifting.61 It is simply a descriptive device
intended to defuse the fallacy of figure of speech in talk about the Queen
Mum and the figure in the portrait, just as it does for talk about the Queen
Mum and Hamlet. Moreover, the appeal to an objectively existing thing
with its objectively existing properties is relevant only when we talk or think
about a representation. There is no need, however, to do that in order to use
the representation.62 Trouble occurs only if thinking of something requires
one to do so by thinking about a representation of that thing; for then the
representation can get in the way.63
To return to Ockham, then, my guess is that the “Terminator” or third
regulative principle for him amounts to the claim that all representation is
like portraiture. This may sound extravagant, but it need be no more than
a strongly relational theory of cognition expressed in the terminology of a
60. As it happens, there are nice questions about real things and places (Hitler,
Paris) appearing in fictional accounts. This should not affect the fallacy of Figure of
Speech I have described.
61. When Adams takes up Ockham’s fictum theory with its appeal to objective
existence, she compares it to a theory developed by Meinong, and she holds that
both theories carry at least a minimal ontological commitment. (William Ockham,
pp. 78ff.). Whatever is to be said about Meinong, I do not see that every account of
objective existence creates such a commitment (see n. 51, above). At first, then, I
thought it was a mistake to attribute such a commitment to Ockham who insisted
that no subjective existence is involved. However, her instincts about Ockham now
seem to me right; although I gloss it a little differently. That is, I think Ockham’s
Terminator Principle does lead him to ghostly sitters; and I think his later criticism
of ficta confirms this. See n. 65, below.
62. In our usual commerce with signs, they are “transparent.” Hume, although
he does not use this terminology, gives the example of reading a book. One attends to
the story, say, and not the letters and words. However, the sign can become opaque
when something makes us attend to the sign itself: a misprint, for example. Or
one may just be interested in fonts and printing techniques. Notice, of course, that
transparent and opaque are not a division of signs but of the way they are taken. It
is not a property or power of the sign-thing that makes the difference.
63. The student driver is at first attentive to turning the steering wheel but soon
enough, without being conscious of that, concentrates on turning the corner. This
is analogous to transparency, I think. That is, I see no reason to posit an “uncon-
scious action (of turning the steering wheel)” as part of or (especially) prior to
turning the corner. Perhaps the problem has to do with confusing a certain kind of
explanation of an action with a phenomenological description of it. Ockham’s own
rejection of the fictum theory shows it was the concept as object that was the problem
(for him).
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strange context.64 However, an appeal to objectively existing things within
that setting can be confusing. The approach I just described in the analogy
with art (and called “esse objecive simplex”) can be seen as taking talk of
fictional things altogether out of (what one might call) the portraiture mode
in order to allow for the merely representational. But Ockham, I think,
locates the appeal to objective existence within the portraiture mode. This
is reflected in his later criticism of the fictum theory, where he ridicules
its “little world of objectively existing entities.”65 But, as I explain below,
Ockham’s primary concern is with the way the concept-as-object closes off
the cognitive process.
As I favor the former approach to the device of objective existence,
Ockham’s ghostly sitters seem to me to make for “funny ficta”; and I think
he is well rid of them.66 Yet there is nothing inconsistent in his account of
them; and, as I explain in the next section, he might tolerate ficta with only
minor ontological discomfort if they did essential work. Moreover, Ockham’s
extension of the scheme to all the things that do not or cannot exist is
understandable as well so long as the context has to do with how we talk
about them.67 Most importantly, there is no danger of those ficta “closing
off” the cognitive process before it gets to its intended objects simply because
these fictional entities are just what we are talking about and not something
we use to talk about anything else. In fact, there is no problem even with
the concept as an object when the issue is what we are talking about when
we talk about a concept.
The real trouble with his early theory comes when Ockham transfers
his account of ficta to the objects of acts of thought generally. And even
here objective existence is not the culprit but rather a mis-application of the
Terminator Principle that treats any act of thinking as having the concept as
its object. When I talk about the concept ‘donkey’, that concept is the object
of my thought. Yet when I use the concept to talk about donkeys, the object
of my thought is donkeys and not concepts. Ockham’s ultimate criticism of
64. This creates a problem only for Ockham’s early theory where, I claim, it
results in ficta that are ghostly “sitters.” In his later theory, he can simply deny that
my drawing is representational, eliminating (from his regimented language) any
direct reference to the flowers and replacing it by talking of the drawing or the
“artist.”
65. Quodlibeta III, q. 4 (OTh IX, 218–19).
66. Once he realizes that (with a more sophisticated semantics) he can do with-
out them, Ockham has no need to revise his account of ficta. It may be also that he
senses in the appeal to objective existence a tendency towards isomorphism (as in
Aquinas’s account of the intelligible species: see n. 51). Adams is critical of Ockham’s
reason for rejecting ficta (and objective existence): William Ockham, Part I, c. 3.
67. Recall that in connection with universals, the problem is the status of “don-
key” in “The Donkey is a mammal,” and not “Brunellus is a donkey.” Difficulties
with the latter come up in connection with the concept-as-object. As with all the
“non-existents,” the question is what are we talking about when we use the relevant
terms?
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the fictum theory makes it clear that he thinks the fictum theory makes just
this mistake of a confusion of objects. It is obvious, I think, that no appeal
to objective existence could compensate for that.
VI.
In the tripartite first stage of Ockham’s development he has not seen this
problem with his early fictum theory. My guess about what lies behind the
take-your-pick approach in those early phases is a rather special choice about
simplicity. The issue is easiest to see in the problem of thoughts about con-
tradictory or non-existent things. The fictum theory has a simpler semantics,
where each act of thinking has its peculiar object. However, because of the
Terminator Principle, it requires a more complex ontology. Conversely, the
mental-act theory has a simpler ontology, with only real individuals as ob-
jects; but it needs a more complex semantics. In the middle phase of the
first stage, Ockham might have said, “You take your choice and you pay the
price.”68 By the time of the Summa Logicae, of course, he has decided that
“cost analysis” overwhelmingly favors the mental-act theory.
The problem with this reconstruction is obvious enough: while it would
account for the “take your pick” character of the first stage, one cannot
but be suspicious of its picture of even the early Ockham as choosing the
simpler semantics. The Ockham we know and love made a career of con-
structing sophisticated semantics to protect his nominalist ontology. How-
ever, one should not underestimate the attractions of the early position.
The oddities of ficta aside, Ockham’s early theory promised a neat (simple)
resolution to a whole nest of problems. It was in keeping with his nomi-
nalism and, by invoking a notion of objective existence, put a minimum
strain on his ontology.69 What comes to bother Ockham about his early
68. Let me try to highlight the point with a comparison to a dispute about neg-
ative facts. I pick it up in the middle with the proponent of negative facts saying:
“I don’t see why you are making such a big fuss about ontological clutter; after all,
negative things take up no room.” (Compare: “ficta have only objective existence.”)
And so far as your supposed ontological simplicity goes, you have to pay for it with a
more complex semantics. By having all propositions apply to the world in the same
way (positive propositions to positive facts, negative ones to negative facts), I have
a simpler scheme with just one relation of correspondence.” At this point, I think
the critic should shift his ground, arguing that his opponent does not have a good
account of negation (cf., a good account of signification); and that seems to me what
Ockham ultimately does. For example, the critic might point out that the negative
fact theory actually eliminates negation. Of course, at this point, his opponent might
reply: “So much for your folk semantics anyhow.”
69. The addition is minimal, as he thinks (compare negative facts). Ontological
clutter is not quantitative. What makes an ontology “lush” (to use Quine’s term) is
the kind of things it subscribes to. The mark of the beast for Ockham is attributing
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position is less its ontology and more its adequacy as an account of signifi-
cation. To understand that, I think we have to pay attention to the semantic
schema he eventually deploys and the sophisticated development that
represents.
As Ockham’s position develops, the problems that, grouped together,
gave rise to the fictum theory come to be dealt with separately, though
within a coherent scheme of modes of signification. First of all, by the
time of the Summa Logicae, Ockham has opted for the strategy of regi-
mentation to handle fictions (including impossible things).70 No object
is needed for these cases if they never appear in referential position (as
subjects or predicates of true propositions). Although he does not expli-
citly describe it as such, Ockham can counter the “thinking of nothing”
charge by shifting to the signification that (in my terms) insures their be-
ing meaningful. There is no object that is a goat-stag (and so no thought
referring to such an object); but the term ‘goat-stag’ is meaningful (and
different from ‘chimera’) because it does signify real things: viz., goats and
stags.
Once Ockham has eliminated any reference to fictional objects, the case
against the concept-as-object is not far behind, though he needs a somewhat
more elaborate schema to carry it off. The important case of second inten-
tion is handled under the rubric of one sign (mental act) signifying another.
That is, the issue of reference to the universals of science and the second
intentions of logic generally can, with a little care, be resolved in terms of
individual mental acts (both as signs and significata). The Terminator Prin-
ciple could now be glossed as: “There is no (meaningful) sign without a
thing signified; and there is no (regimented) concept without an object.”
This allows Ockham to finesse talk of special objects altogether, thus sawing
off the limb on which ficta were perched.
The more controversial element of this reworking has to do with possi-
ble individuals; for they cannot be satisfactorily dealt with using the strategies
sketched above for dealing with fictional entities and with second intentions.
Ockham seems to me to have approached the problem in two different con-
texts. The more straightforward case has to do with the expansion of the
domain of discourse. We can interpret “All men are animals” to apply to
presently existing men, to past and present men, or even to all possible
men, past, present and future.71 This represents an extension of Ockham’s
ontology, but it requires no change in his nominalist project or (if I am
right) his strongly relational account of cognition.72
to real things the properties of the representative system; it is “the worst error in
philosophy” (Expos. perih., prologue, 8 (OPh II, 363).
70. Summa Logicae II, c. 14 (OPh I, 286–88).
71. Summa Logicas I, c. 72 (OPh I, 215–16). Cf., c. 33 (OPh I, 95–96).
72. Ockham is clearly concerned with issues of ontology, but I think places like
this suggest that he is not obsessed about it. See n. 89.
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The other context in which the issue arises for Ockham has to do with
God’s knowledge of unactualized possibles. Clearly with the Terminator
Principle in mind, he insists that such things are truly understood by God
even though they do not (yet) exist.73 I take this to indicate the exceptional
status of this case and not that Ockham means to revoke the principle.74
In terms of my fanciful analogy, it is a sign of God’s omniscience and om-
nipotence that He is able to produce “portraits” of things which will only
subsequently come to “sit” for them.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the mental-act theory intro-
duces some substantial modifications in the structure of mental signification
itself. Of course, if one focuses just on the concept as mental term, its role will
seem to be constant in Ockham’s early and later theories. Yet once the con-
cept has dropped out as the object of the act of thinking—that is, once the
role of a concept-as-object has been eliminated—there remains only the act
of thinking and the things which are its significata (some of which can be
acts of thinking). One may not notice that the act of thinking itself is now
a sign, where Ockham did not treat it as such in the fictum theory. In fact,
the concept-as-act-of-thinking plays such a different role from that of the
concept-as-object that “concept” might well be treated as equivocal in the
two theories.75 Moreover, the sign relation itself changes. The mental-act
theory is simpler not only for dispensing with the concept as object but for
having a dyadic structure. If one abstracts from the oddities of the concept-
as-object, the fictum theory suggests a triadic schema, where the concept is
“taken” by the mental act to represent an external thing. In the mental-act
theory, the relation between the concept-as-mental-act and thing signified
is dyadic.76 In sum, the shift from fictum to mental-act theory is a complex
and not a single issue matter.
73. “[Q]uia creatura nulllum esse tunc habuit, vere tamen tunc intelligebatur.”
Ord., I, d. 36, q. unica (Oth IV, 558/21–22). “[Q]uia etiam quando intelligitur crea-
tura, nihil est, quamvis sit intellecta.” Ord., I, d. 43, q., 2 (646/23–24).
74. As Adams seems to in taking these passages as evidence that, on the mental
act theory, “what makes a thought an act of thinking of x is not that it is directed
towards the objectively existent x but rather that the really existent thought has the
property of being of-x” (William Ockham, pp. 1058–59). As I use the phrase “of-x,” that
would indicate a shift from a relational to a monadic property of thoughts/concepts.
Clearly, these passages presuppose Ockham’s rejection of ficta and of the concept-as-
object. But I think that is not the same as a rejection of an extensionalist or strongly
relational account generally.
75. This may be obscured by the constant role of the mental term itself, as I
suggested above.
76. Charles Peirce is well known for his analysis of the sign relation as triadic:
roughly: nothing is actually a sign until it is taken by someone (an interpretant)
to represent something (an object). Ockham’s own definition of “sign” (probably
following Augustine) has something of that structure: a sign is something that brings
something else to mind. Summa Logicae, I, c. 1 (OPh I 8–9). The mental-act theory,
however, involves only the mental act and its object.
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VII.
It is so obvious that Ockham should have given up on the ghostly sitters that
are his ficta that it is easy to assume that we know why he did. As with the first
stage, however, I think the question of what is going on in this final change
is actually more complicated even than Ockham lets on. Of course, Ockham
has not abandoned the question of the nature of the concept. After all, at
this stage he is unqualifiedly committed to the mental-act theory. It would be
natural enough for him to focus on how concepts as mental acts function
in the cognitive process; however, this does not quite explain Ockham’s
rejection of ficta. Why does he cast the fictum theory as pernicious rather
than just profligate?
Ockham’s critique of the fictum theory in the final stage turns on two
claims: (1) that a fictum is not needed, and (2) that the fictum as object of
thought actually gets in the way of our knowledge of external things.77 I shall
take them up in order. The argument from superfluity may lead one to think
Ockham’s primary concern was with ontological clutter. But the Razor has
as much to do with theoretical inadequacy as ontological commitment.78
What I think Ockham has in mind here by “not needed” is not so much that
ficta needlessly add to one’s ontology but, to adopt Newton’s phrase, that
he “has no need of that hypothesis.” The new strategies I described at the
end of the last section play an important role in allowing Ockham to adopt
this approach.
It is the second claim in Ockham’s attack on the fictum theory that
seems to me more revealing of his motivation. It clearly makes the fictum a
liability and not merely a matter of excess baggage. But it has, on the face
of it, the character of an epistemological or psychological complaint more
than a logical or semantical one.
Historically, it seems most likely that Ockham’s change of attitude came
about under the influence of Walter Chatton while they were together at the
Franciscan House of Studies in London.79 Ockham came to agree with Chat-
ton in criticizing a (broadly epistemological) position of Peter Aureole.80
Aureole takes up cases of perceptual illusion, two of which are representa-
tive. To someone in a boat floating down a river, it might come to seem that it
is the trees along the bank that are moving. A second case is where, looking
77. Quaestiones in physicorum, q. 1 (OPh VI, 397) ; Quodlibeta IV, q. 35 (OTh IX,
472–74).
78. Ockham thinks that, as the result of God’s free act of creation, the world
already contains altogether more things than are necessary. See my “Ockham’s
Cleaver,” Francsican Studies 45 (1985): 119–44.
79. Gideon Gal, “Gualteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham: Controversia de
natura conceptus universalis,“ Franciscan Studies 27 (1967): 191–212.
80. For a detailed account, see Adams, William Ockham, pt. I, c. 3, # 6. I follow
her account of Aureole’s two cases.
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at someone rapidly moving a stick in a circle, one “sees” a continuous circle
and not just the point of the stick in different places. Aureole concludes, in
effect, that these illusions show that “having an impression” is involved in
all sense perception.81
Ockham offers a series of objections, possibly cribbed from Chatton,
some having to do with superfluity but the main ones, I think, developing
what we would today recognize as an anti-representationist line: that is,
the “getting in the way” bit.82 Further, it would not be unreasonable to
suppose that Ockham could have gone pretty directly from that realization
to a rejection of the fictum theory. However—and this is my guess about
what is going on in Ockham’s change to his ultimate stage—I think the
actual course of his thought derived from a seemingly unrelated problem
about our apprehension of propositions.
Susan Brower-Toland has shown that Ockham went through something
of a parallel development in his accounts of the status of concepts and of
propositions.83 Ockham begins with the idea that propositions are one of
the fiction-like objects of acts of thinking. And he ends up with a posi-
tion (like that about concepts) in which propositions are acts of thought
(perhaps composite or semantically equivalent to a composite) signifying
only the individuals signified by their terms.84 Of course, there is a long
medieval tradition of interest in the complexe significabile.85 Despite the la-
bel, however, it had less to do with what a proposition signifies (at least
as Ockham uses that notion) and more to do with what it says: the “dic-
tum.” Again, it is the intermediate stage in Ockham’s development that is
revealing.
Even when Ockham has begun to have doubts about the need for ficta,
he retains the idea that propositions are objects of thought. A number
81. The move from illusions to all perception is familiar as well in more recent
sense-datum theories. See n. 6, above.
82. As Adams points out (William Ockham, 84–85; 549–50), Ockham was (or at
least meant to be) a direct realist all along. He had originally appealed to the fic-
tum theory to account for our ability to think of things that do not or cannot exist
subjectively: universals, the materials of logical analysis (second intentions), merely
possible entities and contradictory things such as chimera and goat-stags. Ockham
treats all these as objects in their own right, and none of them function as interme-
diaries. It is the account of concepts as themselves objects (and ficta) that makes for
the problem. That he might have missed this at first is not surprising: see n. 44.
83. Susan C. Brower-Toland, “Late Medieval Theories of Propositions and Ob-
jects of Judgment: Ockham and the Fourteenth Century Debate” (Ph.D. diss.,
Cornell University, 2002). For the early theory: In sent. I, prologue, q. 1 (OTh I,
16). The intermediate theory: Expos. perih., prologue 6 (OPh II, 357f.). The final
theory: Quodlibeta III, 8 (OTh IX, 233–34).
84. For semantic equivalence, see Quaest. physicorum (OPh VI, 410/115ff). Cf.,
also, Expos. perih., prologue 6 (OPh II, 355–56/110ff.).
85. See Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Con-
ceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland, 1973).
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of things might account for that.86 What seems to occasion Ockham’s
change of position is his own, otherwise innocuous-sounding, claim that
assent and dissent from propositions presupposes apprehension of the
proposition.87 If, for the moment, we gloss “apprehension” as “attending
to,” and if we treat our knowledge of the world around us as propositional
in form, there will be some trouble in fitting in these presupposed app-
rehensions with the directness of our psychological or phenomenological
experience.88
There are cases, of course, where we make a proposition the subject
of predication: for example, “‘Snow is white’ is true.” What Chatton (posi-
tively) and Aureole (negatively) made Ockham face was the possibility that
cases he sees as direct perception would, on his account of presupposed
apprehensions, require a prior attending to a proposition (and/or its terms)
prior to its constituting an awareness of things. He is convinced by Chatton
that this would interpose a (mental) entity—a psychological act or mental
quality—between the acts of knowing and things in the world.89
As it happens, some of Ockham’s earlier formulations of important
notions appeal to prior apprehension of terms as well as propositions.90 It
would not be a simple task to rework them, but there is no obvious reason
to think he could not have carried it off. In fact, however, Ockham does
not always attempt the needed reformulations; though perhaps his short-
ened academic career would account for that.91 In any event, it seems to
me that this concern for problems in connection with the apprehension
of (or attending to) propositions may well be what motivated Ockham’s
ultimate attack on the fictum theory as, in effect, requiring an apprehen-
sion of the concept/term that “gets in the way.” I think this reinforces the
idea that it is the concept-as-object—as terminator—that is crucial to his
early accounts rather than their appeal to objective existence. To resolve
the question definitively, it seems to me, we would need more detail about
when and how the elements of Ockham’s mature semantics, with its sophis-
ticated picture of significative structure, developed.
86. The most obvious, perhaps, is the identification of the same proposition (as
“content”) in different acts of judgment (assent, dissent, doubt, etc.).
87. In sent., I, prologue, q. 1, a. 1 (OTh I, 16–18) and a. 6 (Oth I, 57–58); Quodlibeta
IV, q. 16 and V, q. 6 (OTh IX, 376–80; 500–503). Cf., my “Ockham on Evident
Cognition,” Franciscan Studies 36 (1976); 85–98.
88. Quodlibeta III, q. 8 (Oth IX, 233–34).
89. Ockham could be thinking of Aquinas who says that the verbum is a terminus
of our thinking (Summa Contra Gentiles bk. I, c. 53, 4; De Veritate, q. 3, a. 1), that which
we know and not, as the species is, simply that by which we know: De Veritate Q. 4, a. 2
ad 3.
90. For example, Ockham’s important formulation for evident cognition. As-
sent and dissent from propositions, Ockham says, presuppose apprehension of the
proposition; and apprehension of a proposition presupposes apprehension of its
terms: see n. 87.
91. Adams, William Ockham, pp. 488–89.
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VIII.
Summary and Conclusions
Ockham began his account of the concept with a problematic about non-
existing things: universals, second intentions, possible beings, and fictional
and impossible beings. He thought an object was needed to terminate our
thought about such things which he described as ficta for having only objec-
tive existence. Then, in explaining the passio animae of Aristotle, he adopted
the fictum theory to describe the status of concepts generally as objects of
thought. It was a theory that fit with his nominalism, had a minimal impact
on his ontological commitment and promised to resolve a whole nest of
problems with one blow.
As I see it, the weight of this scheme was carried not by the appeal to
objective existence but rather by the requirement for a terminating object
of all thought. It produced what I described in an analogy with portraiture
as “ghostly sitters.” One might disagree with the requirement but neither
it nor the special ficta create any inconsistencies. (If Ockham has a worry
about objective existence, I think, it is his sensitivity to any hint of isomor-
phism in an account of cognition.) What causes him trouble, as is clear
from Ockham’s later criticism of his early position, is the identification of
the concept as the object of thought generally.
Ockham gradually loses confidence in the fictum theory (favoring the
mental-act theory). And part of the reason for that, I think, is that he comes to
develop a more elaborate semantic scheme that finesses the need to invoke
ficta by providing relatively independent solutions to the original problems.
Talk about universals and second intentions becomes talk of concepts (as
one mental act signifying another). At least some possible individuals are
admitted into his ontology; but Ockham eliminates fictional and impossible
beings, by regimenting them out of subject and predicate position. They are
therefore not objects of thought but they are meaningful for signifying real
things: for example, ‘goat-stag’ signifies goats and stags. This meets the early
charge that even mention of such things would be “thinking of nothing.”
By the end of this first phase of Ockham’s thought about the concept
(around the time of the Summa Logicae), Ockham has dispensed with the no-
tion of the concept-as-object, identifying the concept with thought or think-
ing as a mental act. He then turns his attention to the semantic structure
needed to support that position. The shift from fictum to mental act, how-
ever, requires a number of changes that are more complicated than Ockham
lets on (or that commentators have recognized). For example, the mental
act now becomes a sign and the sign process takes on a dyadic rather than
triadic character. Although (rightly) dispensing with the concept-as-object,
Ockham seems to me to retain a strongly relational account of cognition. At
least it fits well enough with his general approach where meaning is handled
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in terms of reference (rather than sense) and where isomorphism is assidu-
ously avoided.
In the last stage of Ockham’s thinking about concepts, he goes beyond
a simple preference for the mental-act theory to a full critique of the fictum
theory. His concern there, however, is not so much semantics as epistemol-
ogy. His early theory of the concept as the object of thought generally (and
not just with fictions) would preclude the possibility of direct or immediate
perception of external things by prematurely closing off our cognitive pro-
cesses within the mind. My final guess is that Ockham first comes to this
antirepresentationist argument in connection with the apprehension of
propositions, and that the rejection of the concept-as-object falls out of
that inquiry.
The whole development of Ockham’s position on the concept takes
place in a relatively short period of time. But our understanding of both his
early and late positions would be improved by more detailed information
about when and how he developed the different elements in his semantic
theory. The later “epistemological” arguments, on the other hand, suggest
an interesting historical counterfactual: How would Ockham have handled
the reformulations that his new schema requires?
